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Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract:       
In recent years, regulators have increased their focus on the capital adequacy of 
banking  institutions  to  enhance  their  stability,  hence  the  stability  of  the  whole 
financial system. The purpose of this paper is to assess and compare how American 
and European  banks adjust their level of capital and portfolio risk under capital 
regulation, whether and how they react to constraints placed by the regulators. In 
order to do this, we estimate a modified version of the simultaneous equations model 
developed by Shrieves and Dahl. This model analyzes adjustments in capital and risk 
at banks when they approach the minimum regulatory capital level. The results 
indicate that regulatory requirements have the desired effect on bank behavior. Both 
American  and  European  banks  that  are  close  to  minimum  requirements 
simultaneously  increase  their  capital.  In  addition,  the  US  banks  decrease  their 
portfolio risk taking.  
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1.  Introduction  
Regulation of financial markets has become one of the most discussed topics by both academics 
and practitioners in last years. The terms such as Basel II, Solvency II, MiFID are widely used by 
financial market players. This paper intends to contribute to these discussions as it tries to evaluate 
regulatory pressure on selected banks around the world. 
The basic aim of the paper is to assess the behavior of American and European banks and to 
analyze their reaction to regulatory pressure (one of the form of banking regulation). We try to 
answer two key questions: Does regulatory pressure induce the American and the European banks 
to increase their capital? Does strengthening of capital requirements induce them to increase or 
decrease their portfolio riskiness? 
To answer the key questions we estimate a modified version of the simultaneous equations model 
developed  by  Shrieves  and  Dahl  (1992).  In  the  model,  regulatory  pressure  is  one  of  the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variables are changes in risk and capital. The model is 
modified in two main aspects; we use more advanced approaches towards the regulatory pressure 
variable (we model the regulatory pressure variable in three different ways) and we include also 
year dummy variable to capture year-specific effects. There are many methods that can be used to 
estimate the model; we have chosen the method of two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) estimates in order to test for the robustness of the results. 
Data for our research were obtained from BankScope, a database which has statement data on 
more than 11,000 banks worldwide. We take into consideration panel data for 1,240 American and 
European banks from the 2000-2005 period. 
As  we  discuss  later  in  the  paper,  conclusions  of  our  research  contribute  to  the  literature  by 
providing  empirical  support  to  the  theories  provided  by  Shrieves  and  Dahl  (1992),  Kim  and 
Santomero (1988) and Koehn and Santomero (1980). 
This paper is organized as follows. The second part gives a theoretical background of banking 
regulation. The following part provides a theoretical framework for the research. The fourth part 
describes  the  model  and  data  used.  The  fifth  part  discusses  the  results  of  our  research  and 
compares them with the findings of other authors. Finally, the sixth part concludes the paper and 
state final remarks.   
2.  Background of banking regulation 
Increased  regulation  of  bank  capital,  when  compared  to  other  entrepreneurship  entities stems 
basically from the fact that a bank balance sheet differs significantly from a balance sheet of a 
common company. The main difference is that bank capital
1 represents just a small portion of 
assets while the portion of liabilities to assets is large. This is because the majority of a bank´s 
sources
2 are comprised of outside resources, mainly from customer deposits and deposits from 
                                                
1 Here we have on our mind a firm's value which is equal to assets minus liabilities. 
2 Total sources are composed from shareholders´ equity and total liabilities.   2 
banks. On the other hand, bank assets are composed mainly of loans, leases to customers, and 
securities. From this, it follows that a bank is more vulnerable when compared to a company since 
it has a higher share of liabilities. Therefore, unexpected losses which a bank may face may not be 
well covered by its capital if it is too low. This is why regulators force banks to increase their 
capital to a minimum level so the  banks can cover their potential losses and this risk  is not 
transferred to bank customers. Financial services, especially banking, play an important role in the 
economy of every country. It is natural then to regulate the financial risks because a bank’s failure 
may affect the entire country’s economy. The main aim of bank regulation is to avoid failures and 
protect all bank customers in order to secure a stable and healthy banking system and thus also 
secure a stable currency. 
Until the mid 1970s there was no international institution which would coordinate domestic and 
international bank regulation. As the amount of international financial flows grew and the number 
of  banks  with  worldwide  activities  also  grew,  the  need  for  international  cooperation  became 
greater than ever. As banks tried to access foreign markets, the question arose: Who was to be 
responsible for bank regulation and bank policy? Was it the rules of a “parent” country or a host 
country?  The  transnational  banking  system  was  becoming  more  interconnected  and  different 
dangers arose as a result of different legal requirements. For example, when there was a country 
which imposed less restriction on the domestic banks with international activities, it could be a 
danger for the second country with more restriction if a bank from the first country came to this 
second country. The stability of the financial system with stricter policy was exposed to more risks 
than before and it became more vulnerable. 
The significant decline in capital adequacy has been widely observed throughout the 1970s. There 
were serious disturbances in the international currency and banking markets. In December 1981, 
in an attempt to reverse further decline, the bank regulators issued explicit capital standards for 
banks (and bank holding companies in the United States), which required them to hold a minimum 
amount  of  capital  equal  to  a  fixed  percentage  of  their  total  assets.  Although these  minimum 
regulatory standards have been given credit for increasing bank capital levels, the 1980s saw the 
number of bank failures rise to a level not seen since the Great Depression.  
Thus  the  regulators  in  the  following  years  focused  more  on  the  capital adequacy of  banking 
institutions in order to enhance the stability of financial systems. A major step in that direction 
was the 1988 agreement amongst the central banking authorities from 12 countries on the minimal 
capital requirements for internationally active banks. These countries formed a standing committee 
called the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.  This committee proposed a set of minimal 
capital requirements for banks. Their implementation started in 1989 and was completed in 1993. 
These standards are often referred to as the Basel Accord (BCA or Basel I). 
The Basel I standards have achieved a wide degree of acceptance, extending beyond the member 
countries  of  the  Basel  Committee,  and  have  thus  acquired  a  scope  which  reaches  beyond 
internationally active banks. At present, they are implemented in both domestic and international 
institutions in over 100 countries.  
However, despite its many achievements, in recent years it has become clear that Basel I requires a 
radical  update  due  to  accelerating  market  innovations  and  the  development  of  new  risk 
management techniques. In response to criticism of Basel I, a number of changes were made, 
culminating in the final document of the new capital accord (NBCA or Basel II) being released in 
June 2006 and valid since January 1, 2007. The overall objective of Basel II is to increase the 
safety and soundness of the international financial system by i) making capital requirements for 
banks  more  risk  sensitive  while,  ii)  maintaining  the  same  level  of  overall average regulatory 
capital in the banking system.
3 
                                                
3 For more information about Basel I and Basel II see Matejašák (2006), Teplý (2006) or Teplý et al. (2007).   3 
3.  Theory review 
Several opinions on regulating bank capital exist. For instance, Santos (2000) noted that moral 
hazard problems and the potential externalities resulting from bank failures. In addition he stated 
that insurance schemes have proven successful in protecting from bank runs, but at a cost that this 
leads to moral hazard. By offering a guarantee that depositors are not subject to loss, the providers 
of deposit insurance bear the risk that they would otherwise have born. As a result, it diminishes 
depositors’ incentive to monitor banks and to demand an interest payment adequate to the risk 
profile of a bank. Further, when the insurance scheme charges to banks a flat rate premium, the 
banks then do not fully internalize the full cost of risk and therefore it has an incentive to take on 
more risk. Then there is a concern that a bank may hold less capital than is socially optimal 
relative to the risks that the bank takes (Rim, 2001). This may endanger bank stability. Hence, 
regulation plays an important role in preserving financial stability. 
There is much literature dealing with the capital and risk relationship; we can find a number of 
different  theories  giving  conflicting  predictions  of  whether  more  stringent  capital  regulation 
curtails  or  promotes  bank  performance  and  stability.  One  branch  of  literature  introduces  the 
stabilizing effects of capital requirements. The stabilizing effects are based on the option-pricing 
model. In this model, an unregulated bank takes excessive portfolio and leverage risks in order to 
maximize  its  shareholder  value  at  the  expense  of  deposit  insurance  (see  Furlong  and  Keeley 
(1989), Keeley and Furlong (1990)). While capital requirements cannot eliminate these moral 
hazard incentives, they can reduce them by forcing banks to absorb a larger part of potential 
losses.  Therefore,  the  value  of  the  deposit  insurance  option  decreases  and  the  incentives  for 
excessive risk taking diminish. Thus, capital regulation leads to more capital and less risk taking, 
and hence to lower probability of a bank default. In addition, Bichsel and Blum (2002) note that 
capital represents the stake a bank has to lose in case of insolvency. Therefore, the bank has an 
incentive  to  incur  lower  risks  and  a  higher  amount  of  capital.  Hence,  this  incentive  effect 
reinforces  the  banks’  stability.  Under  these  conditions,  changes  in  capital  and  risk  will  be 
negatively  correlated.  In  addition,  Jacques  and  Nigro  (1997)  argue  that  there  is  a  negative 
relationship between changes in risk and capital. They claim that an undercapitalized bank can 
meet the risk-based requirement by raising capital, reducing portfolio risk, or both while a well-
capitalized bank may decrease capital or increase risk. 
Another branch of literature gives different predictions. Kim and Santomero (1988), Koehn and 
Santomero  (1980)  agree  with the above theory that  more stringent  capital requirements  force 
banks  to  increase  their  level  of  capital,  but  they  argue  that  capital  is  very  costly.  Using  the 
maximizing  mean-variance  framework  they  formally  show  that  more  stringent  capital 
requirements lead to an increase in risk taking as the forced increase in expensive capital financing 
reduces the expected rate of return. To counter this, the bank tries to increase its rate of return by 
investing into riskier assets. Thus, when the increase in risk overcompensates the increase in 
capital, increased regulatory capital standards may have the unintended effect of causing utility-
maximizing banks to increase portfolio risk, and hence increasing the probability of bank default. 
Under these conditions, changes in capital and risk will be positively correlated. 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) give a different rationale why banks that have built up capital have, at 
the same time, also increased their risk. They argue this is consistent with a number of hypotheses 
(bankruptcy  cost  avoidance,  managerial  risk  aversion,  etc)  which  are  not  mutually  exclusive, 
meaning that each may underlie capital and risk decisions at any point in time in some subset of 
banks. The “Bankruptcy cost avoidance” hypothesis states that expected bankruptcy costs are an 
increasing function of the probability of a bank default. Therefore, banks tend to increase their 
capital if there is an increase in their portfolio risk and vice versa. Alternatively, the “managerial 
risk  aversion”  hypothesis  states  that  bank  managers,  as  agents  of  stockholders,  may  have  an 
incentive  to  reduce  the  risk  of  bank  insolvency  more  than  is  desired  by  stakeholders,  since   4 
managers have a great deal to lose personally in the event of a bank’s insolvency. Thus, managers 
whose banks have increased their portfolio risk may compensate it by setting a high capital level, 
thus giving rise to a positive relationship between changes in capital and risk. 
On the other hand, Heid, Porath and Stolz (2003) argue that the assumptions of the above theories 
are not realistic, as these theories abstract from rigidities and adjustment costs. However, the 
reality is somewhat different from the theory because banks may not be able to instantaneously 
adjust capital or risk due to adjustment costs or illiquid markets. They also note that breaking the 
minimum regulatory requirements may be very costly for a bank. The breach of the rules may lead 
to repeated regulatory penalties and in some cases even to a closure of a bank. As noted by 
Lindquist (2003), a poorly capitalized bank runs the risk of losing its reputation and confidence 
from customers. Hence, Heid, Porath and Stolz (2003) conclude that banks have a rather strong 
incentive to obey the rules. To decrease the probability of breaking the rules, banks hold more 
capital than is required. They hold a “capital buffer” which serves as an insurance against violating 
the minimum capital requirement. The authors add that the incentive to hold a “capital buffer” 
increases  as  the  probability  of  breaking  the  regulatory  minimum  increases.  For  example,  the 
probability of breaking the rules increases with higher capital ratio volatility. Finally, in contrast to 
the above theories, the “capital buffer theory” predicts that the capital and risk adjustments depend 
on the size of the capital buffer. The banks with a high capital buffer will try to maintain it on a 
safe level, while the banks with a small capital buffer are more likely to break the minimum rules, 
so they will try to increase their capital buffer until it reaches a safe level. Hence, the “capital 
buffer theory” predicts capital and risk adjustments will be positively related for banks with high 
capital buffers, while capital and risk adjustments will be negatively related for banks with low 
capital buffer. 
More recently, Jeitschko and Jeung (2004) presented a new unified approach to investigate the 
relationship between bank risk taking and bank capital. They introduced a model that incorporates 
the incentives of three agents; the deposit insurer, the manager and the shareholder. Their results 
show that a bank’s risk can either increase or decrease with capitalization. The final effect depends 
on the relative forces of the three agents.  
An increasing number of papers have tried to test the above theories in order to find the empirical 
relationship between capital and risk adjustments. For a summary of findings we refer to Section 
5.4 where we compare our results with the results of other authors. 
4.  Building a model 
In this part we will empirically test the capital and risk behavior of US and EU banks. We will 
introduce the Shrieves and Dahl simultaneous equations and then we will describe the data and 
explain why the 2SLS and 3SLS estimation procedures are used.  
4.1   Model specification 
To our knowledge, we are the first to test and compare the capital and risk behavior of US and EU 
banks. We base our analysis of US and European banks’ capital behavior on the simultaneous 
equations model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992). This model is used to assess how banks 
react to requirements placed by the regulator on their capital. An important aspect of the model is 
that it recognizes that changes in both risk and capital have endogenous (i.e. discretionary) and 
exogenous components. In the model, observed changes in capital and risk levels include the two 
components: a discretionary adjustment and a change caused by factors exogenous to the bank. 
When talking about exogenous changes to capital, these can be the result of enforced increases in 
capital  required  by  regulators  or  unanticipated  changes  in  earnings  caused  by  fluctuations  in 
income. With respect to risk, exogenous changes include unanticipated shocks to the national or   5 
local economy, such as the changing characteristics of a bank loan portfolio or volatility of loan 
collateral such as real property. Hence, the model looks like: 
 
  ∆CAP j ,t = ∆
d CAP j ,t + E j ,t                 (1) 
  ∆RISK j ,t = ∆
d RISK j ,t + S j ,t               (2) 
 
where ∆CAP j ,t  and ∆RISK j ,t are the observed changes in capital and risk levels, respectively, 
for bank j in period t, the variables  ∆
d CAPj,t  and  ∆
d RISK j ,t  are the discretionary changes in 
capital and risk while E j ,t   and  S j ,t  are  random shocks. 
Following Shrieves and Dahl (1992), the discretionary changes in capital and risk, ∆
d CAPj,t  and 
∆
d RISK j ,t , are modeled using the partial adjustment framework, thereby recognizing that banks 
may  not  be  able  to  adjust  their  desired  capital  ratio  and  risk  levels  instantaneously.  In  this 
framework, the discretionary changes in capital and risk are proportional to the difference between 
the target levels and the observed levels in period t-1: 
 
∆
d CAP j ,t = α  (CAP* j ,t - CAP j ,t-1)               (3) 
∆
 d RISK j ,t = β  (RISK * j ,t - RISK j ,t-1)          (4) 
 
where CAP* j ,t and RISK* j ,t are bank j ’s target capital and risk levels, respectively; α, β are 
parameters.  
Substituting equations (3) and (4) into equations (1) and (2), the observed changes in capital and 
risk can be written as: 
 
  ∆CAP j ,t = α  (CAP* j ,t – CAP j ,t-1) + E j ,t         (5) 
  ∆RISK j ,t = β  (RISK *  j ,t – RISK j ,t-1) + S j ,t         (6) 
This means that the observed changes in capital in period t is a function of the target capital in 
period t (CAP* j ,t), the capital in period t-1 (CAP j ,t-1) and random shocks E j ,t. The observed 
changes in risk in period t is a function of the target risk level in period t (RISK *  j ,t ), the risk 
level in period t-1 (RISK j ,t-1 ) and random shocks S j ,t. The target capital ratio and the risk level are 
not directly observable, but are assumed to be dependent on some set of observable variables 
describing the bank’s financial condition and the state of the economy in each country. Aggarwal 
and Jacques (2001) give an example of exogenously determined random shock to the bank that 
can influence its capital level: a change in the bank´s macroeconomic environment. 
4.1.1  Definitions of Capital and Risk 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Heid, Porath and Stolz (2003), Godlewski (2004) and others used the 
following definition of capital (CAP); the ratio of total regulatory capital to total assets in book 
values (RCTA). Total capital represents total regulatory capital. It measures Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital  which  include  subordinated  debt,  hybrid  capital,  loan  loss  reserves  and  the  valuation 
reserves. 
In this study we will follow Jacques and Nigro (1997), Murinde and Yaseen (2004) and others. We 
will use alternative definition of capital; the ratio of total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets   6 
(RCRWA).  This  definition  has  become  more  popular  since  the  introduction  of  risk-weighted 
assets in Basel accords (see above). As mentioned above, total capital represents total regulatory 
capital; it includes Tier 1 and Tier 2. 
The definition of bank risk (RISK) is quite problematic and the literature suggests a number of 
alternatives, all of which are subject to some criticism. In this study we opt for the ratio of risk-
weighted assets to total assets. This measure is in line with the standard work in this area. It was 
proposed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and used subsequently by Jacques and Nigro (1997), Rime 
(2001), Aggarwal and Jacques (1997), Heid, Porath and Stolz (2003), Roy (2005b) and many 
others. The rationale for using this arbitrary measure is that portfolio risk is primarily determined 
by the allocation of assets across the different risk categories. A clear advantage of RWA, as Rime 
(2001) suggests, is that it reflects decisions of a bank on risk-taking with appropriate timeliness. 
Support for this measure can be also found in Avery and Berger (1990). They have shown that this 
ratio is positively correlated with risky behavior. However, as Rime (2001) notes, the reliance on 
this indicator supposes that the risk weightings correctly reflect the economic risk of the different 
asset categories which might not be necessarily valid in practice.  
However, it should be pointed out that alternative (and probably even better) measures of risk 
(such as value at risk, economic capital or the volatility of the market price of bank assets) were 
not available for the sample banks during the observed period, hence it was not possible to test for 
robustness of the results with respect to different definitions of risk. 
4.1.2  Variables Affecting Changes in Banks’ Capital and Risk 
The partial adjustment model, presented in equations (5) and (6), predicts that changes in capital in 
period t are a function of the target capital, the lagged capital and any exogenous factors while 
changes in risk in period t are a function of the target risk, the lagged risk and any exogenous 
shocks.  In  the  following  section  we  introduce  the  possible  explanatory  variables,  which  are 
proxies for the target capital and risk levels, and their expected impact on banks’ capital and risk. 
All  these  variables  have  been  used  by  Shrieves  and  Dahl  (1992),  with  the  exception  of  the 
profitability  indicator,  emphasized  by  Rime  (2001)  and  Roy  (2005a),  and  the  year  dummy 
variable, proposed by Heid, Porath and Stolz (2003) and used also by Godlewski (2004) or Roy 
(2005a). The explanatory variables are bank size (SIZE), profitability indicator (ROA), regulatory 
pressure (REG), current loan losses (LLOSS), changes in risk (∆RISK) and capital (∆CAP) and 
year dummy variable (dy2001 – dy 2005). 
Size (SIZE) 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Rime (2001) and others state that size may influence target risk and 
capital  levels  due  to  its  relationship  with  risk  diversification,  the  nature  of  bank  investment 
opportunities or the bank ownership characteristics and access to equity capital. As Shrieves and 
Dahl (1992) note, “access to equity capital may affect the relative importance of bankruptcy cost 
avoidance or managerial risk aversion theories”. Aggarwal and Jacques (1997) pointed out that 
larger banks may be willing to hold less capital owing to the fact that they have better ability to 
increase capital if needed when compared to other banks. In addition, as noted by Roy (2005a), 
large banks carry out a wider range of activities which should increase their ability to diversify 
their portfolio, and hence to reduce their credit risk. Thus, we will include the SIZE variable in the 
capital and in the risk equations to capture size effects. SIZE will be measured as the natural log of 
bank total assets. SIZE variable is supposed to be inversely related to changes in risk and capital. 
Profitability Indicator (ROA) 
Rime (2001), Roy (2005a) and others argue that current profits (which are measured here as return 
on assets, ROA) may have a positive effect on banks’ capital as profitable banks may prefer to   7 
increase capital through retained earnings than through equity issues. Banks have to rely mainly 
on retained earnings to increase capital. The bank’s return on assets (ROA) is included in the 
capital equation with an expected positive effect on capital.
4 
Current loan losses (LLOSS) 
Loan loss provisions represent funds that banks set aside to cover bad loans. We will follow the 
definition  of  Roy  (2005b),  which  was  also  used,  by  Aggarwal  and  Jacques  (1997),  and 
approximate these losses (LLOSS) with the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. We can 
consider this ratio as a proxy for asset quality. Banks with lower asset quality (higher LLOSS) are 
expected to have higher risk. Therefore, we will include LLOSS in the risk equation with an 
expected positive effect on risk. 
Changes in risk (∆ RISK) and capital (∆CAP) 
The theories discussed in Section 3 suppose that capital and risk decisions are interdependent and 
determined simultaneously which suggests the inclusion of ∆ RISK in equation (7) and ∆ CAP in 
equation (8). Following Shrieves and Dahl (1992), we will include these two variables in the right 
part of the model in order to allow for the different relationships between them. By this inclusion 
we can find out whether changes in bank capital and asset risk are positively or negatively related 
one to another (or whether there is no relationship at all). Thus, at the end we can support one of 
the theory branches mentioned in Section 3. 
 
Table 1: Expected signs of bank characteristic variables 
 
Year dummy variables (dy2001 – dy 2005) 
Heid, Porath and Stolz (2003), Roy (2005b) and others used also year dummy variable to capture 
further year specific effects. We will include this variable in the risk and capital equation as well. 
We will cover the five-year period from 2000 to 2005. We will assign a dummy variable for each 
reference  period,  except  for  year  2000  in  order  to  avoid  perfect  collinearity.  These  dummy 
variables are added to the model specification in order to take account of macroeconomic shocks 
(for example changes in the volume or in the structure of loan demands) that can systematically 
impact bank capital and credit risk ratios. 
4.1.3  Modeling regulatory pressure 
The main emphasis of this study is on the regulatory pressure variable (REG). This variable is 
meant to capture the impact of the Basel capital requirements (the response of banks to the 8 % 
risk-based  capital  standard)  as  it  describes  the  behavior  of  the  banks  that  fell  short  of  the 
regulatory  standards.  Moral  hazard  theory  predicts  that  a  bank  approaching  the  regulatory 
minimum capital ratio may have an incentive to boost capital and reduce risk in order to avoid the 
regulatory costs triggered by a breach of the capital requirements. However, others argue that 
                                                
4 All the authors predict positive effect of ROA on capital, however Murinde and Yaseen, using exactly the same argument as for 
example Rime, predict negative coefficient of ROA. See Murinde and Yaseen (2004).    8 
poorly capitalized banks may be tempted to take more risk in the hope that higher expected returns 
will help them to increase their capital. We expect that regulatory pressure has a positive impact 
on changes in capital. Its impact on changes in risk is the question. 
i) REG –“The simple method” 
The regulatory  pressure can be evaluated  in several ways. Shrieves  and Dahl  (1992) adopt a 
simple approach wherein the regulatory pressure variable is unity if the bank´s capital is below the 
minimum 8 % level and zero otherwise. 
ii) REG – “Prompt Corrective Action method” 
Aggarwal and Jacques (1997) measure regulatory pressure using a more advanced approach: the 
Prompt  Corrective  Action  (PCA)  that  classifies  between  adequately  capitalized  and 
undercapitalized institutions. Within the PCA based approach, they build a first regulatory variable 
PCAU, which is unity for banks with a CAR less than 8 % and zero otherwise, and a second 
regulatory pressure variable PCAA, which is unity for banks with CAR comprised of between 8 
and 10 % (included), and zero otherwise. To clarify, REG is replaced by two regulatory variables 
PCAU and PCAA and the following applies: 
 
PCAU  = 1   if CAR < 8 % 
= 0    otherwise 
PCAA  = 1   if 8 % < CAR < 10 % 
= 0    otherwise 
iii) REG – “Gap magnitude method” 
The previous two methods emphasize one aspect; there is a certain level below which a bank 
should be regarded as undercapitalized and hence influenced by capital adequacy rules. Some 
authors such as Roy (2005b) criticize such approaches because they create just a simple dummy 
variable that is equal to one when capital adequacy ratios are below the stated minimum level and 
zero otherwise. Godlewski (2004) and others take into account more information. They also take 
into consideration the second characteristic of supervisory pressure – the magnitude of regulatory 
pressure experienced by the bank, the gap between the bank’s capital ratio and minimum capital 
level. The need to take this information into account leads us to adopt the use of the following 
regulatory pressure variable: 
 
REG = THR -CAR   if CAR <THR 
        = 0     otherwise 
where  CAR  stands  for  capital  adequacy  ratio  and  THR  represents  the  threshold  level.  This 
approach was suggested by Roy (2005a) and we will adopt it. We opt THR to represent 8%. Thus, 
supervisory pressure is positive whenever CAR < 8%, but decreasing as CAR approaches 8% 
from below. Banks with a CAR above 8% are considered to be unaffected by capital adequacy 
regulation. 
iv) REG – “Advanced gap magnitude method” 
Jacques and Nigro (1997) used a more advanced approach. Similar to the PCA approach, the 
regulatory pressure was divided into two variables (REGA and REGB) in order to recognize that 
banks with total risk-based capital ratios above and below the 8 % regulatory minimum may react 
to the standards in different ways.    9 
REGA equals the difference between the inverse of individual bank capital ratio (CAR) and the 
inverse of the regulatory minimum risk-based ratio of 8 %. Hence, REGA equals (1/CAR– 1/8) for 
all banks with risk-based ratios of less than or equal to 8 %, and 0 for all banks with a total risk 
based  ratio  above  the  required  minimum.  This  measure  is  used  to  recognize  the  non-linear 
relationship between the regulatory capital and either change in portfolio risk or capital ratios. 
These banks are under considerable regulatory pressure to increase their capital ratios as they do 
not meet the regulatory minimum standards.  
REGB measures “distance to default” from above. It equals the difference between the inverse of 
the regulatory minimum risk-based ratio of 8 % and the inverse of individual bank capital ratio 
(CAR). Hence, REGB equals (1/8 – 1/CAR) for all banks with risk-based ratios greater than or 
equal to 8 %, and  0 otherwise. Although banks with  capital ratios in excess of 8 % are not 
explicitly constrained by the regulatory minimum, they may increase their risk of portfolio assets 
or reduce their capital ratios. Alternatively, as noted by Furlong (1993) or Jacques and Nigro 
(1997), these banks may increase their capital ratios as a buffer against shocks to equity
5. Because 
banks  must  meet  the  minimum  regulatory  standards  on  a  continuous  basis,  the  risk-based 
standards  may  cause  these  banks  to  increase  their  capital  ratios  or  decrease  portfolio  risk  as 
insulation against any uncertainty regarding whether the banks meet the regulatory minimum. In 
addition, increasing capital ratios and decreasing risk for these banks may serve as a signal to both 
market and bank regulators that these banks are in compliance. 
v) REG – “Capital volatility approach” 
This approach to regulatory pressure has one significant advantage when compared to the previous 
methods. Let us assume that we have two banks, A and B, both having the same capital ratio. The 
difference is that bank A’s capital is more volatile than bank B’s capital. Hence, the probability of 
possible violation of the regulatory minimum is higher for bank A than for bank B, even though 
both have the same capital buffers. To capture this effect we define regulatory pressure as a 
dummy variable which is unity if a bank’s capital ratio is below the threshold level which is equal 
to  the  minimum  capital  requirement  plus  one  standard  deviation  of  the  bank’s  own  capital 
adequacy ratio, zero otherwise. 
REG = 1   if CAR < (8 % + bank-specific standard deviation of CAR) 
        = 0   otherwise 
Although the choice of one standard deviation is somehow arbitrary, the rationale for using this 
measure is that banks build a buffer above the regulatory minimum for precautionary reasons and 
the amount of this buffer depends on the volatility of capital ratio, so this approach utilizes more 
information  than  previous  methods  as  it  utilizes  also  volatility  of  CAR.  This  approach  was 
suggested by Roy (2005b). 
Because the regulatory pressure is of our prime interest, we will estimate the model using the last 
three  measures  of  regulatory  pressure,  the  “Gap  magnitude  method”,  the  “Advanced  gap 
magnitude  method”  and  finally  “Capital  volatility  approach”.  Especially  the  “Advanced  gap 
magnitude method” and “Capital volatility approach” have significant advantages when compared 
to the simple methods: the “Simple method” and “Gap magnitude method” completely leave out 
banks that are above the threshold but may get below if their results deteriorate. Those are actually 
interesting cases. Although under the PCA approach these banks are included (those are defined as 
banks with CAR between 8 % and 10 %), this approach does not fully utilize the variability of 
available data as it transforms a continuous variable (CAR) into three groups. 
                                                
5 There are also other reasons for which a bank may hold capital above the required minimum, for example Orgler and 
Taggard discussed tax considerations. Source: Orgler, Y.E. and R.A. Taggard, 1983, Implications of corporate capital 
structure theory for banking institutions, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 15, p. 212-221.   10
The advantage of the “Gap magnitude approach” is that it utilizes the magnitude of pressure, while 
the advantage of the “Advanced gap magnitude approach” is that it also utilizes information on 
banks  which  are  above  the  threshold;  it  measures  distance  to  default.  Last  but  not  least,  the 
“Capital  volatility approach” utilizes volatility of CAR. 
4.1.4  Specification 
On the basis of the previous analysis, the model defined by equations (5) and (6) is specified as 
follows: 
 
∆CAP j ,t =  0 α +  1 α  REG j ,t-1 +  2 α  ROA j ,t  +  3 α  SIZE j ,t  +  4 α  ∆RISK j ,t  +  5 α  CAP j ,t -1  +  6 α  
dy2001 + …+  9 α  dy2005 + ε  j ,t                          (7) 
 
∆ RISK j ,t =   0 β +   1 β REG j ,t-1 +  2 β LLOSS j ,t  +  3 β SIZE j ,t  + 4 β ∆CAP j ,t  + 5 β RISK j ,t-1  +  
6 β dy2001 + …+  9 β  dy2005 + υ  j ,t                              (8) 
 
where REG represents regulatory pressure defined:  
(i) under the “Gap magnitude” approach used by Roy (2005) and others as: 
  
      REG = 8 % - CAR   if CAR < 8 % 
        = 0     otherwise 
 
(ii) the “Advanced gap magnitude” approach used by Jacques and Nigro (1997), REG is replaced 
by two regulatory pressures variables REGA and REGB and the following applies: 
 
   REGA= (1/CAR – 1/8)   if CAR ≤  8 % 
              = 0             otherwise 
  REGB= (1/8 – 1/CAR)   if CAR  ≥ 8 % 
              = 0          otherwise 
 (iii) under the “Capital volatility” approach: 
 
                     REG = 1         if CAR < (8 % + bank-specific standard deviation of CAR) 
                                                 = 0         otherwise 
4.2  Data used 
Data on the EU 15 and US banks were obtained from BankScope, a database of bank account 
figures. The database is a joint product of Fitch Ratings (a major rating agency) and Bureau Van 
Dijk (publisher of financial databases). 
Banks that did not report their total capital ratio for at least two consecutive years were omitted 
from the data set. To obtain a homogenous sample, banks with capital ratio above 100 % were 
treated as outliers and excluded from the sample. However, those banks that disappeared through 
mergers and acquisitions do remain part of the sample because their assets and liabilities appear on   11
the  balance  sheet  of  the  acquiring  bank.  The  figures  are  measured  on  a  yearly  basis  which 
represents the highest periodicity for which data is systematically available. 
All the variables used in this study were available on BankScope, except for the RISK variable. 
Therefore, the total capital level K = (Tier 1 + Tier 2), total assets (A) and the capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) was extracted from the database in order to compute the RISK variable in two steps. 
In the first step risk-weighed assets were calculated (RWA) and in the second step the RISK 
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The sample consists altogether from 5,323 observations on 1,263 US and EU-15 banks which 
were in existence between 2000 and 2005. 
Table 2: Basic Sample Characteristic  




EU 15  580  2 116 
USA  683  3 207 
TOTAL  1 263  5 323 
Source: Own calculations 
The following table shows the mean values of the sample for some bank characteristics for both 
American and European banks for each of the six sub-periods.The table also includes changes in 
risk and capital. 
Table 3: Means of bank characteristics, by year 
EU 15 USA EU 15 USA EU 15 USA EU 15 USA EU 15 USA EU 15 USA
CAR % 14,0 14,7 15,0 15,0 14,9 15,3 15,2 15,2 14,6 15,0 14,5 15,0 14,9
SIZE t 8,1 7,5 7,5 7,6 7,6 7,7 7,8 7,7 8,2 7,9 8,7 7,9 7,8
ROA t 0,7 1,1 0,7 1,1 0,6 1,2 0,8 1,2 0,9 1,2 1,0 1,2 1,0
LLOSS t 0,003 0,003 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,002 0,003
CAP t 14,0 14,7 15,0 15,0 14,9 15,3 15,2 15,2 14,6 15,0 14,5 15,0 14,9
RISK t 0,66 0,67 0,66 0,67 0,66 0,66 0,67 0,67 0,68 0,68 0,63 0,69 0,67
    CAP t -0,05 -0,38 0,98 0,37 -0,08 0,30 0,28 -0,17 -0,53 -0,16 -0,12 -0,03 0,03
    RISK t 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 -0,04 0,01 0,00
No. of obs. 352 633 434 612 427 572 431 533 416 450 56 407
2004 2005 Grand 
average




Source: Own calculations 
 
 
For instance, we can see that average CAR of both US and European banks ranges around 15 %. 
Although this figure is relatively far above the required 8 % threshold, to make a well-funded 
statement whether the banks are sufficiently capitalized or not, one would need to run a more 
thorough analysis including stress tests which is beyond the scope of this paper, nor it is the aim of 
this study to analyze whether the banks are sufficiently capitalized.  
Regarding  the  development  in  European  banks,  in  2000  the  average  CAR  was  13.9%  with 
corresponding risk-weighted ratio of 66 %. Over the period the average CAR has witnesses a 
small increase to 14.5 % and the risk-weighted assets ratio recording a slight decrease to 63% in   12
2005.  Likewise the average ROA has witnessed an increase from 0.7% in 2000 to 1.0% in 2005 
meaning that the profitability of the European banks increased during the examined period. 
In the case of US banks, the average CAR ranged between 14.7 and 15.3% and average ROA 
ranged between 1.1 and 1.2 %. When profitability is measured by ROA, we can conclude that for 
every  year  American  banks  were  more  profitable  than  their  European  counterparties  but  the 
difference in profitability diminishes in time. This may be explained also by the fact the average 
risk-weighted assets ratio of US banks was higher or equal to the risk in EU banks in every year of 
the examined period. US risk-weighted ratio increased during the examined period from 66%in 
2000 to 69% in 2005. 
When looking at correlation matrices (not presented in the paper), the correlation matrix is for US 
banks similar to the matrix for the EU 15 banks. The matrices show a positive correlation between 
RISK variable and changes in RISK (0.340 for European banks and 0.221 for US banks). This 
indicates that the riskier banks increase their risk behavior more than other banks. The correlation 
matrices show that there is a negative size effect on capital for both US and European banks (-
0.275 and -0.452 respectively) meaning that large banks hold in general less capital than smaller 
banks. For a summary of theories explaining this finding we refer to Section 3.1 where we in 
detail discuss the reasons of negative size effect on capital. 
The interesting part here is that we can observe a negative cross sectional correlation between 
levels  of  CAP  and  RISK  for  both  European  and  US  banks  (-0.314  and  -0.521  respectively). 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) argue that the negative correlation between CAP and RISK levels is due 
to cross-sectional variation in risk preferences: banks with high risk aversion choose high capital 
ratios and low risk, whereas banks with low risk aversion choose low capital ratios and high risk. 
4.3  Methodology 
To solve the model, we estimate the system of simultaneous equations defined by (7) and (8) using 
both, a two–stage least squares (2SLS) procedure and three-stage least-squares (3SLS) procedure. 
Both techniques are used in order to test for robustness of the results. 2SLS framework allows us 
to take account of the simultaneity of banks’ adjustments in capital and risk. It recognizes the 
endogeneity of changes in  capital and  risk, so it is preferable to single equation models that 
assume either risk or capital to be an exogenous variable to the bank. 2SLS, unlike ordinary least 
squares (OLS), provides consistent parameter estimates. 
3SLS technique also recognizes the endogeneity of changes in capital and risk. Thus, unlike OLS, 
it provides consistent estimates of the parameters. Moreover, it is preferable to two-stage least 
squares  (2SLS)  because  3SLS  is  a  full  information  technique  which  estimates  all  parameters 
simultaneously. In addition, 3SLS takes into account the cross-equation correlations, so in using 
this technique we get estimates that are asymptotically more efficient than under 2SLS estimates. 
However,  as  noted  by  Intrilligator  (1978),  3SLS  may  be  sensitive  to  misspecification  or 
measurement errors. This suggests the comparison of the 2SLS and 3SLS results. 
2SLS, as the name suggests, is done in two steps. In the first step we estimate the reduced form 
equations using OLS and save the fitted values for the dependent variables. This step is done to 
obtain consistent parameter estimates. In the second step we estimate the structural equation using 
OLS but replace all endogenous variables with their fitted values from the first stage.
6 
3SLS method provides one additional step in the estimation procedure. This extra step allows for 
non-zero covariance between the error terms. It is asymptotically more efficient than 2SLS since 
                                                
6 From the structural equations one can derive the reduced-form equations and the associated reduced form coefficients. A reduced-
form equation expresses the endogenous variable solely in terms of exogenous variables and the stochastic disturbances. For the 
derivation we refer to the Econometric literature listed in References.   13
the latter ignores any information that may be available as the errors across equations may be 
correlated (Zellner, 1962). 
The 2SLS and 3SLS procedure were run with the SAS software package. 
5.  Empirical results 
Estimation of simultaneous equations (7) and (8) using 2SLS produces essentially the same results 
as 3SLS. Therefore, the latter is retained for the remainder of the study as the 3SLS estimation 
method is more efficient. 
5.1  “Gap magnitude method” - empirical results 
We first present the empirical results for the model based on the “Gap magnitude” approach 
towards the REG variable. Under this approach, REG is defined as the difference between the 
regulatory minimum and bank capital adequacy ratio for all bans that were undercapitalized, zero 
otherwise. The model results are shown in the following table: 
 
Table 4: Results - Gap magnitude approach  
Estimation 
method
Variables  CAP t     RISK t  CAP t     RISK t
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ROA t 0,0979 1,31 0,4481 *** 8,89
SIZE t -0,4556 *** -9,49 -0,0042 *** -4,71 -0,1365 *** -3,00 -0,0012 * -1,67
LLOSS t 2,2580 *** 5,05 0,4504 *** 4,96
REG t-1 1,2763 * 1,84 -0,0014 -0,09 2,1363 1,23 -0,0545 * -1,95
RISK t-1 -0,2110 *** -15,24 -0,1043 *** -12,09
CAP t-1 -0,3726 *** -19,92 -0,1629 *** -13,49
     RISK t 11,3001 *** 3,46 23,1693 *** 4,23
     CAP t 0,0005 0,52 0,0023 * 1,89
Dum 2001 0,4801 1,35 -0,0197 *** -2,76 0,8880 *** 3,69 -0,0155 *** -4,14
Dum 2002 0,4309 1,21 -0,0182 ** -2,55 1,3464 *** 5,12 -0,0244 *** -6,29
Dum 2003 0,3291 0,94 -0,0011 -0,16 0,6201 *** 2,63 -0,0063 -1,64
Dum 2004 0,2766 0,78 -0,0054 -0,75 -0,0407 -0,17 0,0031 0,78




*** indicates significance at the 1 % level
** indicates significance at the 5 % level











Before analyzing the regulatory pressure and the overall relationship between capital and risk, we  
discuss the signs of the remaining variables and we start by presenting the results which are 
essentially the same for both US and EU banks.  
Banks  with  lower  asset  quality  (higher  LLOSS)  had  greater  risk.  SIZE  has  a  negative  and 
significant impact on capital, indicating that large American and European banks increased their 
capital  less  than  other  banks.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  these  banks  compete  on 
international markets where they have to face fiercer competition with international banks that are 
in general less capitalized (Rim, 2001). Roy (2005) states that large banks have easier access to 
capital markets and therefore they can operate with lower amounts of capital. Alternatively, as 
noted by Roy (2005) or Lindquist (2003), this may be due to a diversification effect. The argument 
is that portfolio diversification reduces the probability of experiencing a large drop in the capital 
ratio. And the diversification increases with bank size. Lindquist (2003) also explains that large 
banks may feel less regulatory pressure due to a “too big to fail” effect. If large banks expect   14
support from the government in the event of difficulties, while this is not, to the same extent, 
expected by small banks, we should expect large banks to hold lower capital buffers.  
The parameter estimates on lagged capital ratios were negative and significant with the parameter 
estimates of -0.37 for the EU banks and -0.16 for the US banks. The parameter estimates on 
lagged  risk  ratios  were  also  negative  and  significant  (-0.21  for  EU  banks  and  - 0.10  for US 
banks.). In general, these values imply adjustments of bank capital ratios and risk to desired levels. 
Looking at the amplitude of the estimates we can observe that European banks are quicker in 
adjustment of both capital and risk to desired levels. The difference between US and European 
banks is  that for the American banks current earnings (ROA) have a significant and positive 
impact on changes in capital. This means that profitable US banks can more easily increase their 
capital through retained earnings. The primary purpose of this study was to assess the impact of 
regulatory pressure on the behavior of banks, especially how it affects banks’ risk taking and 
levels of capital. The problem of the “Gap magnitude approach” and even the “Advanced gap 
magnitude approach” is the very low number of officially undercapitalized institutions; this may 
have reduced the reliability of parameter estimates based on this approach. There are just 38 cases 
in the sample for European banks that actually had capital below the regulatory minimum. This 
represents just 2 % of the European sample. This problem exaggerates even more for US banks 
where the results under this approach are driven just by four cases out of 3,172. This problem led 
us to more advanced approaches to the definition of REG pressure, especially to the “Capital 
volatility approach” (for the results of which we refer to Section 5.3).  
Bearing in mind the mentioned limitation, we have estimated the model for both European and 
American  banks.  Surprisingly,  for  the  undercapitalized  European  banks  we  get  the  expected 
results. The regulatory pressure has a positive and significant impact on capital. This indicates that 
undercapitalized  European  banks  improve  their  capital  adequacy  by  increase  in  their  capital. 
Ceteris paribus, European banks that were under regulatory requirement increased their capital by 
1.28 % percentage points more than other banks. However, the risk equation for European banks 
indicates that regulatory pressure is not significant. This implies that European banks under the 
threshold do not decrease their risk. Put together, European banks that face regulatory pressure 
prefer to increase their capital rather than decrease their risk. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  REG  estimates  obtained  for  the  American  banks  indicate  a  “mirror 
situation”;  the  regulatory  pressure  is  significant  in  the  risk  and  not  significant  in  the  capital 
equation
7. In the risk equation, the regulatory pressure has a negative impact on bank risk taking 
which indicates that American banks below the regulatory minimum decreased their risk-weighted 
assets in their portfolio. This means that banks might have shifted their asset portfolio out of 
heavily weighted risky assets such us corporate bonds into zero weighted riskless assets such as 
government bonds. Put together, American banks that face regulatory pressure prefer to decrease 
their risk rather than increase their capital. We can conclude that the regulatory pressure brought 
about by Basel I standards was effective; undercapitalized European and US banks increased their 
capital or decreased their risk behavior. 
We observe a predominantly positive relationship between changes in capital and risk. Table 4 
illustrates that in the case of US banks, an increase of 1 percentage point in capital increased the 
risk by a very small amount (0.002 percentage point) while a similar increase in risk led to an 
increase in capital by 23.2 percentage points. In the case of European banks, increase in capital 
had no significant impact on risk while 1 percentage point increase in risk led to an increase of 
capital by 11.3. Hence, it appears that both European and US banks raise their risk and capital 
simultaneously. 
                                                
7 This is rather surprising result as the REG variable shows little variability in the US sample as virtually all US 
observations were above the threshold.   15
If we look back in Section 3, we find out that this result is consistent with the predictions of Kim 
and Santomero (1988), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and others. Kim 
and Santomero (1988), Koehn and Santomero (1980) argue that more stringent capital regulation 
will cause utility, maximizing banks to increase their risk. They state that a forced increase in 
expensive capital financing reduces the expected rate of return. To counter this, banks try to 
increase their rate of return by investing into riskier assets. However, our results indicate that 
additions to capital overcompensate the additions to risk, so the regulatory standards do not have 
the unintended effect of increasing the probability of bank default. Alternatively Shrieves and 
Dahl (1992) argue that the positive relationship between changes in risk and capital is consistent 
with a number of non-mutually exclusive hypotheses, including bankruptcy cost avoidance and 
managerial risk aversion hypothesis. Finally, the time dummies are significant in the risk equation 
for 2001 and 2002 for both European and American banks, so we can conclude the existence of 
further macroeconomic shocks which resulted in decrease of bank risk taking in these two years. 
Time  dummies  in  the  capital  equation  are  all  insignificant  for  the  European  sample,  which 
suggests that target capital levels were relatively constant across years during the examined period. 
On the other hand, the target capital levels in the USA increased in 2001, 2002 and 2003. 
These first results should be deepened; therefore we turn to the second type of REG definition. 
5.2  “Advanced gap magnitude method” - empirical results 
The results and conclusions from the “Advanced gap magnitude approach” are similar to the “Gap 
magnitude approach”; for both US and EU banks we observe similar coefficient estimates and 
identical signs. For the interpretation of control variables, see the previous section. 
 
Table 5: Results - “Advanced gap magnitude approach” 
Estimation 
method
Variables  CAP t     RISK t  CAP t     RISK t
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ROA t 0,0535 0,70 0,4646 *** 7,67
SIZE t -0,4080 *** -8,40 -0,0056 *** -4,55 -0,1419 *** -3,08 -0,0013 * -1,73
LLOSS t 2,3100 *** 5,11 0,4631 *** 4,64
REGA t-1 54,9098 * 1,93 0,1552 0,27 115,8782 1,26 -3,2284 ** -2,21
REGB t-1 39,3652 *** 4,04 -0,2583 -1,64 -7,9955 -1,00 -0,0567 -0,48
RISK t-1 -0,2173 *** -14,99 -0,1073 *** -10,16
CAP t-1 -0,4899 *** -14,03 -0,1407 *** -6,03
     RISK t 9,6567 *** 3,02 24,2619 *** 4,43
     CAP t -0,0016 -1,14 0,0016 0,88
Dum 2001 0,5158 1,47 -0,0197 *** -2,83 0,9034 *** 3,75 -0,0151 *** -4,00
Dum 2002 0,4594 1,31 -0,0182 *** -2,63 1,3763 *** 5,22 -0,0237 *** -5,84
Dum 2003 0,3562 1,04 -0,0007 -0,10 0,6354 *** 2,69 -0,0059 -1,49
Dum 2004 0,2464 0,71 -0,0048 -0,69 -0,0330 -0,13 0,0033 0,84




*** indicates significance at the 1 % level
**  indicates significance at the 5 % level











The  added  value  of  this  model  is  the  inclusion  of  the  extra  regulatory  variable  REGB  that 
examines the banks that are above the threshold as this variable measures the distance to threshold. 
We will focus on this extra variable.   16
For the American banks we observe that REGB has no significant impact on both capital and risk, 
but the examination of the Table 5 brings rather interesting results for the European banks. The 
variable REGB is likewise the variable REGA positive and significant in the capital equation. This 
implies that banks, which had capital ratios in excess of the requirements, behave in the same way 
as the banks below the threshold; they increase their capital ratios. But the parameter estimate on 
REGB  suggests  that  banks  with  capital  ratios  significantly  above  the  threshold  experienced 
smaller increases in capital than banks that were below the threshold. This means that banks below 
the threshold want to rebuild their capital while the banks above the threshold want to maintain 
their capital buffer. This conclusion is consistent with the finding of Haubrich and Wachtel (1993) 
who suggest that Basel I standards were effective in raising capital ratios of all banks – banks that 
were below the threshold, but also banks that were already in compliance with the minimum risk 
based  standards.  This  result  may  be  interpreted  as  “cautionary  behavior”.  Jacques  and  Nigro 
(1997)  state  that  very  well  capitalized  banks  have  stronger  desire  to  maintain  bigger  capital 
buffers, so this is a signal to regulators and the market that they do not only meet, but clearly 
exceed the minimum standards. Alternatively, Furlong (1993) argues that well capitalized banks 
may increase their capital ratios because they want to build a buffer against shocks to equity
8. 
Because banks must meet the minimum regulatory standards on a continuous basis, these buffers 
are used as insulation against any uncertainty regarding whether the banks meet the regulatory 
minimum. 
5.3  “Capital volatility approach” - empirical results 
We have estimated our model using the “Capital volatility approach”. Within this approach, the 
REG is a dummy variable that is unity if the bank’s capital ratio is below the minimum level plus 
one bank-specific standard deviation, zero otherwise. If REG is defined in this way, we find that 
there were 271 European cases (13 percent of the EU sample) and 123 American cases (4 percent 
of the US sample) that were under regulatory pressure. 
 
Table 6: “Capital volatility approach” - results 
Estimation 
method
Variables  CAP t     RISK t  CAP t     RISK t
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ROA t 0,1011 1,36 0,4187 *** 8,68
SIZE t -0,4558 *** -9,48 -0,0042 *** -4,61 -0,1032 ** -2,28 -0,0015 ** -2,08
LLOSS t 2,2561 *** 5,05 0,4537 *** 4,97
REG t-1 0,6683 * 1,96 -0,0013 -0,18 3,1327 *** 7,59 -0,0477 *** -6,71
RISK t-1 -0,2109 *** -15,18 -0,1029 *** -11,76
CAP t-1 -0,3663 *** -18,98 -0,1501 *** -12,93
     RISK t 11,5107 *** 3,52 22,3755 *** 4,24
     CAP t 0,0006 0,54 0,0034 *** 2,65
Dum 2001 0,4683 1,31 -0,0197 *** -2,76 0,8566 *** 3,64 -0,0159 *** -4,16
Dum 2002 0,3908 1,10 -0,0181 ** -2,54 1,3273 *** 5,17 -0,0254 *** -6,43
Dum 2003 0,3125 0,90 -0,0011 -0,15 0,6615 *** 2,86 -0,0076 * -1,92
Dum 2004 0,2749 0,77 -0,0054 -0,75 -0,0316 -0,13 0,0030 0,73




*** indicates significance at the 1 % level
** indicates significance at the 5 % level











                                                
8 There are also other reasons for which a bank may hold capital above the required minimum, for example Orgler and 
Taggard discussed tax considerations. Source: Orgler, Y.E. and R.A. Taggard, 1983, Implications of corporate capital 
structure theory for banking institutions, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 15, p. 212-221.   17
The results of the analysis for the control variables apart from REG variable are materially similar 
in  both  capital  and  risk  equations  to  the  “Gap  magnitude  approach”  for  both  American  and 
European banks. To illustrate, SIZE has a negative impact on capital suggesting that large banks 
increased their ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets less than other banks, LLOSS has positive 
and significant impact on risk which means banks with lower asset quality (higher LLOSS) had 
greater risk. For the case of US banks current profits (ROA) have significant and positive impact 
on capital indicating that profitable US banks easily improve their capitalization using retained 
earnings. 
Table 6 shows that this approach led to significant estimates of the regulatory pressure in the 
capital equation for European, but also for US banks. Ceteris paribus, banks within one standard 
deviation of the threshold increase their capital more than other banks. European banks close to 
minimum  regulatory  requirements  increased  their  capital  to  risk-weighted  assets  ratio  by  0.7 
percentage points more than other European banks. When compared to US banks, the impact of 
regulatory pressure is even greater in the USA. The US banks that were below the minimum 
requirement plus one standard deviation increased their capital to risk-weighted assets ratio by 3.1 
percentage points more than other US banks. Thus, the impact of the regulatory pressure is larger 
in amplitude for US banks than for EU banks. One possible explanation is that European banks 
may have greater difficulties in adjusting their capital or that US regulators have a stricter attitude 
towards undercapitalized banks so that US banks fear breaking the rules more than their European 
counterparties.  
In the risk equation, nothing new occurs; the regulatory pressure has a significant and negative 
impact  only  for  US  banks.  I  n  conclusion,  our  findings  provide  basic  evidence  that  Basel  I 
standards have a positive effect on both US and European banks’ capital adequacy ratios. Second, 
if under regulatory pressure, both European and US banks increase their capital. In addition, the 
US banks also decrease their risk. 
5.4  Comparison with other findings 
As  presented  in  Section  3.1,  theory  provides  rather  rivaling  predictions  on  the  relationship 
between capital and riskiness of banks. As shown in the following table, the empirical studies on 
the issue do not provide any clear conclusions either. 
 
Table 7: Comparison with other findings 
` Year  Sample and Period
Impact of regulatory 
pressure on CAP





This study 2007 580 European banks and 683  US banks over 6 
years (2000 - 2005)
+ for B (EU banks)                 
0 and + for B (US banks)
0 for B (EU banks)                 
- for B (US banks)
+ for B
Roy 2005 586 banks from G10 (with assets over $100 
million) over 8 years (1988-1995)
- and 0 for B + and 0 for B - for B
Murinde and Yassen 2004 98 banks in 11 contries during 8 years (1995-2002) - and + for B - and 0 for B - and 0
Abhiman and Ghosh 2004 27 Indian banks over 7 years (1996-2001 -for B - for B - for B
Heid, Porath and Stolz 2003 570 German savings banks over 8 years  (1993-
2000)
- and 0 for B + and 0 for B 0
Shrieves and Dahl 1992 1,800 US banks over 3 years (1984-1986) + for B - for B + for B
+ for A in 91                     
+ for U in 91
0 for A in 92
0 for U in 92
- for A in 93-96
- for U in 93-96
+ and - in 91   
+ and - in 92
+ in 93-96
Note: + significantly positive, - significantly negative, 0 insignificant
         A adequately capitalized banks, U undercapitalized banks, B banks as a whole
Aggarwal and Jacques 2001 1,685 US banks (with assets over $100 million) 
over 6 years (1991-1996)
+ for A in 91                         
+ for U in 91                                     
0 for A in 92                             
0 for U in 92                             
0 for A in 93-96                          
0 for U in 93-96
Rime 2001 154 Swiss banks over 8 years (1989-1996) 0 for A                                   
+ for U
0 for A                                     
0 for U
0
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Although all of the authors listed in the above table based their analyses of bank behavior to large 
extent on the Shrieves and Dahl (1992) model, the results and conclusions differ significantly. Our 
results are similar to the findings of Shrieves and Dahl (1992) who analyzed the behavior of 1,800 
US  banks  over  3  years,  from  1984  until  1986,  just  before  the  Basel  I  requirements  were 
implemented. Our results are similar to theirs in the key conclusions: there is a significant positive 
impact of regulatory pressure on capital and a negative and significant impact on risk levels; 
changes in risk and capital levels are positively related. 
The empirical findings of other research papers go in opposing directions. Table 7 shows that 
some  authors find  that regulatory  pressure positively  influences capital ratios in banks, while 
others find a negative relationship. When it comes to the impact of regulatory pressure on risk 
levels, their conclusions also differ considerably. Some authors find a positive relationship while 
others find a negative relationship. Alternatively, some authors find no relationship. Finally, the 
conclusions also differ significantly when it comes to the question of the relationship between 
changes in risk and capital, as already mentioned in Section 3.1.  
5.5  Suggestions for future research 
We see several ways in which we can improve our research. Firstly, an intertemporal comparison 
may reveal interesting facts about regulatory pressure. However, analyzed regulatory pressure was 
under Basel I only, so the next step could be a comparison between Basel I conditions (i.e. until 
the end of 2006) and Basel II conditions (i.e. since the year 2007). 
Secondly, the research can be done on a larger scale so as to include banks outside the EU and the 
US (i.e. banks from Africa, Asia, Australia, New Zealand etc.).  
Thirdly,  another  methodology  for  measuring  regulatory  pressure  such  as  seemingly  unrelated 
regression could be applied (instead of 2SLS and 3SLS methods used in the paper).  
Fourthly, we did not differentiate between banks from emerging and mature markets. For example, 
a comparison among EU-12 and EU-27 banks can convey interesting new results. 
Finally,  as  a  proxy  for  risk  we  used  the  ratio  of  risk-weighted  assets  to  total  assets.  Other 
alternative measures of risk (such as value at risk, economic capital or the volatility of the market 
price of bank assets) can also be used. However, these measures face the challenge of limited data 
availability. 
6.  Conclusion 
Bank  capital  requirements  play  a  prominent  role  in  sustaining  financial  stability.  There  are 
different  theories  that have rivaling  predictions about how banks adjust their risk and capital 
behavior to imposed regulatory constraints. To our knowledge, we are the first to test and compare 
the capital and risk behavior of US banks and banks from the EU 15 region. Using the freshest 
data  from  the  2000–2005  period  we  have  estimated  a  modified  version  of  the  simultaneous 
equation model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992). The model is modified in two main 
aspects; we use more advanced approaches towards the regulatory pressure and we include also 
year  dummy  variable  to  capture  year-specific  effects.  We  find  that  capital  regulation  has  a 
significant impact on capital and risk taking for both US and EU 15 banks in several respects. We 
find that both European and US banks close to the minimum regulatory threshold tend to increase 
their capital adequacy by increasing their capital. American banks in addition reduce their risk-
taking.  These  findings  indicate  that  expected  penalties  implied  by  possible  breach  of  capital 
obligations have the desired effect on bank behavior and that bank capital regulation is effective in 
binding excessive risk taking.   19
Moreover, we find empirical evidence that even well capitalized EU banks try to maintain their 
capital on a safe level. This may relate to “cautionary behavior”. Finally, we observe a positive 
and significant relationship between capital levels and risk exposure for both US and EU banks. 
This means that banks raise their risk and capital simultaneously. Hence, we contribute to the 
literature by providing empirical support to the theories provided by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), 
Kim and Santomero (1988), Koehn and Santomero (1980) who all predict a positive relationship 
between risk and capital adjustments. 
However, our results indicate that additions to capital over-compensate the increase in risk, so the 
regulatory  standards  do  not  have  the  unintended  effect  of  increasing  the  probability  of  bank 
default. 
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